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Political theorist Sofia Näström reminds us that “the people” is “one of the more used 
and abused concepts in the history of politics”1. Perhaps its vagueness, the fact that it 
can be given alternative and even contradictory meanings, explains why it could be used 
so efficiently as a mobilizing tool. This category is central for conceptions of 
democracy, nationalism, and populism. Yet it is difficult to point out who the people 
are. Contrary to assertions of politicians, activists, and some folklorists, “the people” is 
not a primary datum
2
. It is not there, waiting for someone to discover its essence, or for 
someone to represent or to embody its interests. The people is foremost a discursive 
construct, and a claim made in struggles between politicians, activists, and intellectuals. 
The people like Janus has two faces: “it menaces the political order at the same 
time that grounds it”3. The concept of the people is still used, as in earlier times, to refer 
to the threat of dangerous mobs that could be mobilized by demagogues. Hegel “argued 
that talking about the people as the ultimate source of institutions and procedures 
merely gives political charlatans and nationalist demagogues an empty phrase with 
which to conjure up terrible mischief”4. Other scholars and activists challenged images 
of the dangerous masses by constructing the people as inherently virtuous, and rightful. 
They imagine the people as a “mythic being that is not only the source of political 
legitimacy, but can sometimes appear to redeem politics from oppression, corruption, 
and banality”5. 
Given its vagueness, it is not a surprise that Frederick Engels “reacted brusquely 
to a reference to ‘the people in general’ in the 1891 Erfurt Programme, asking ‘what is 
that?”6 Can the people speak, and if so how does it talk? Does it speak by voicing 
individual preferences that can be counted in public opinion polls, and as individual 
votes? Can the people speak with one voice when they rebel to demand their 
recognition? Who speaks for the people? Who has the power to speak about the 
people?
7
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Using examples of leftwing populists discourses from Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador, this paper analyzes 
the ambiguous meanings of the concepts of “the people” and populism. It illustrates 
how these concepts oscillate between poles: whole and part, active and passive, threat 
and promise. It analyzes debates about who are the people, who speaks on their behalf, 
and what are their relations with democratic ideals. The first section analyzes how the 
external and internal boundaries of the people are constructed. It explains how the 
concept of populism inherited views of the people as a danger to democracy. The 
second focuses on attempts to give recognition to those considered as not having a 
voice, “those who have no part”, “who do not count”, “who have no entitlement to 
exercise their power”8. The third studies the different images of the two bodies of the 
people. The next analyzes the conceptions of democracy that ground constructions of 
the people as individual actors of everyday politics, and as the eschatological savior of 
democracy. The fifth explores different attempts to speak for the people, and to 
represent or to embody its will and interests.  
 
The boundaries of the people 
A “people” is defined in contrast to other peoples. Bernard Yack reminds how 
British patriots defined themselves in opposition to those “garlic-eating” Catholics 
across the Channel
9
. Narratives of peoplehood, Rogers Smith writes, combine economic 
stories, political power stories, and constitutive narratives
10
. The later focus on the 
member’s race, ethnicity, religion, history, and culture that is constitutive of their 
identities. These narratives that integrate appeals to reason and to emotions are the 
foundation for projects of people building. 
Narratives of peoplehood do not only define an US in opposition to external 
boundaries, they also include and exclude those who are the rightful and moral 
members of national communities. The people need to be constantly redefined and 
purified. Members are included and excluded according to criteria such as culture, 
“language, blood, and territory”11. Rogers Smith shows how the US was imagined as a 
white nation that included all European immigrants, excluding those racialized as 
nonwhite Others. The legacies of white supremacist images of the US continue to 
inform the self-understanding of the extreme right. The impossibility of accepting an 
African American as president encouraged sectors of the right to get involved in what is 
known as the Tea Party.  
In Latin America narratives of mestizaje –understood as cultural and ethnic 
mixing– were used to exclude indigenous people, while simultaneously inviting them to 
belong to the nation on the condition that they abandoned their cultural specificity. 
Indigenous movements in Latin America rejected the politics of mestizaje, demanding 
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their socioeconomic and cultural inclusion and recognition. Evo Morales, the first 
indigenous president of Bolivia, is carrying out what his regime describes as a 
decolonizing revolution. Yet, it remains ambiguous what does the Morales’ regime 
mean by decolonization, who makes the plural people of Bolivia, and who speaks for 
the people. For example, Morales recognizes the worth of indigenous people when his 
discourses portrait them as the embodiment of national values. Yet, when indigenous 
people challenge his policies, as when they opposed the building of roads in the TIPNIS 
National Park, they are stigmatized as enemies of the nation. 
Elites linked the people to the mob. The images of “the dangerous mass” 
inherited from Crowd Psychology and Mass Society theories continue to inform popular 
and academic descriptions about the menace of the rabble. The mob is feared because it 
is seen as irrational, and as a danger to civility. It brings the specters of disorganization, 
and anomie. So ingrained are the fears of the mob, that one of the common meanings of 
the term “pueblo” in Spanish refers to the wretched, the oppressed, the un-ruled, and 
uncivilized.  
In Latin America elites continue to view the unruly and mostly nonwhite pueblo 
as the mob. In Venezuela the opposition appropriated the term “civil society” for their 
organizations made up of people of relatively privileged ethnic and class backgrounds. 
They portrayed themselves as rational, democratic, and organized citizens, the true 
embodiment of the democratic and rational people. Using long-held views of the poor, 
the privately owned media constructed Chávez’s followers as primitive and uncivilized 
mobs, and as the antithesis of the rational and democratic pueblo. As Luis Duno 
Gottberg shows the media racialized Chávez’s followers with images that painted them 
as the embodiment of barbarism and as threat to civil and democratic society
12
.  
After the introduction of structural adjustment policies under Carlos Andrés 
Pérez’s second administration (1989-93) populist followers were transformed into 
“barbaric masses” The hike in the price of domestic gasoline in 1989, Fernando Coronil 
argues, broke the bond between the paternalistic state and the people based on the 
shared assumption of the birthright of all Venezuelans for oil rents. Massive 
demonstrations turned into two days of “massive rioting and looting, escalating from 
neighborhood groceries stores to commercial centers in Caracas and other cities”13. 
After these events poor people were transformed into “an unruly and parasitical mass to 
be disciplined by the state and made productive by the market”14. This rebellion named 
as the Caracazo conveyed elite nightmares of the savage, uncivilized, disorganized 
rabble that invaded the centers of civility. These constructions of the rabble as the 
antithesis to reason and civilized behavior allowed or justified state fierce and brutal 
repression that ended in at least 400 deaths. 
Elites sometimes use paternalistic arguments to depict their mission as the duty 
to transform the unruly mob (el pueblo) into civilized and educated citizens of their 
nations. When the poor, the nonwhite, and the excluded accept the paternalistic embrace 
of their elites they are not feared. They are protected and treated with maternal and 
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paternal love. But when the excluded and marginalized rebel or riot, as in Venezuela 
during the Caracazo, they are stigmatized as a threat, and are imagined as an irrational 
force that needs to be contained by any means necessary. 
Elites construct the excluded as incapable of rational speech. “If there is 
someone you do not wish to recognize as a political being, Rancière writes, you begin 
by not seeing him as the bearer of signs of politicity, by not understanding what he says, 
by not hearing what issues from his mouth as discourse”15. Exclusions are based on 
symbolic configurations of ways of speaking, seeing, and acting. “The Roman patrician 
power refused to accept that the sounds uttered from the mouths of the plebeians were 
speech
16
. Differently from rational citizens who deliberate in the public sphere, and 
participate in the institutions of liberal democracy, the mob is considered to act 
irrationally. They riot to destroy, to loot, and to kill. Contrary to citizens, who reason 
their political preferences, and vote on behalf of political platforms, the people when 
viewed as the mob follow their emotions. Plebiscitary democracy based on the 
manipulation of emotions by demagogues is the antagonist, it is argued, of democracy 
based on reason. 
The concept of populism in Latin America was built around images of the 
irrational mob. Gino Germani, an Italian born sociologist who migrated to Argentina to 
escape from Mussolini’s jail and who witnessed the birth of Juan Perón’s populist 
movement in the 1940s, interpreted it as an example of working class totalitarianism. 
For Germani populism was a phase in Latin America’s history linked to the transition 
from a traditional to a modern society. Rapid and abrupt structural change caused by 
urbanization and industrialization created masses in a state of anomie. Perón is 
portrayed as a charismatic leader who appealed to the emotions of these irrational 
masses to get to power and to govern. Even though Perón’s populism was 
democratizing in so far as it incorporated previously excluded masses into political life, 
it had authoritarian traits. Peronism, Germani wrote, “gave workers an experience of 
political and social participation in their personal lives, annulling at the same time 
political organizations and the basic rights that are the pillars for any genuine 
democracy”17. 
Since Germani’s seminal essays, Latin American scholars have debated on 
whether populism is a phase in the history of the region, whether it is irrational or not, 
and on whether it is a threat or a corrective for liberal democracy
18
. Most scholars no 
longer link populism to pathologies such as the irrationality of the masses, or to the 
manipulation of powerful charismatic charlatans. Populism is conceptualized as a 
discourse and/or as a political strategy. Populism is based on a discourse that pits the 
people and the elites as antagonistic poles. It is based on a moral and even religious 
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Manichean worldview
19
. Populism is also a political strategy to achieve power and to 
govern allegedly on behalf of the people, bypassing existing institutions
20
. According to 
Weyland’s influential definition, populism is a political strategy for winning and 
exercising power based on the direct, unmediated, non-institutionalized support of large 
numbers of followers. 
The conceptions of the people of most Latin American populists seek to 
empower (politically, economically, and culturally) excluded segments of the 
population. Chávez rhetoric, for example, politicized relations of inequality between 
different classes and ethnic groups. He reclaimed Venezuela’s indigenous and black 
heritages that were downplayed by the Punto Fijo white elites during Venezuela’s 
pacted democracy
21. Chávez tapped into the “deep reservoir of daily humiliation and 
anger felt by people of the lower classes”22. On the one hand, Chávez’s populist 
mobilization activated and incorporated previously excluded people. But, on the other, 
he co-opted or reduced the autonomy of organizations of civil society. This is why as in 
other populist experiences there are collusions between attempts of top down 
mobilization and responses and demands from the grass roots that go beyond the 
intentions of their leaders. 
 
The Virtuous and Mythical People of Populism 
Scholars and activists challenge images of the dangerous mob portraying the 
people as the mythical bearer of virtue. Jules Michelet, the historian of the French 
Revolution, exalted the people as the “embodiment of two treasures: the first is the 
virtue of sacrifice, and the second are instinctual ways of life that are more precious that 
the sophisticated knowledge of the so-called cultured men”23. Mikhail Bakunin wrote: 
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Peruvian Case”, World Politics, 48 (October 1995), pp. 82-116; Kurt WEYLAND, “Clarifying a Contested 
Concept. Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics”, Comparative Politics, vol. 34/1 (2001), pp. 
1-22. 
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and Pía Riggirirozzi (ed.), Governance After Neoliberalism in Latin America., New York, Palgrave, 2009, 
p. 161. 
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Durham and London, 2010, p. 85. 
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“the people is the only source of moral truth […] and I have in mind the scoundrel, the 
dregs, uncontaminated by bourgeois civilization”24. 
Populism is a politics of cultural and symbolic recognition of the despised under 
classes
25
. Populist discourse transforms the humiliations that the rabble, the uncultured, 
the unseen, and those who have no voice have to endure in their daily life into sources 
of dignity and even redemption. Paraphrasing Rancière, “it consists in making what was 
unseen visible, in making what was audible as mere noise heard as speech”26. Those 
who are excluded and stigmatized with administrative categories such as “the poor”, 
“the informal”, and “the marginal” become “the people” conceived as the incarnation of 
all virtue. And those who constantly humiliate them become the hideous elites.  
Populist politicians are famous for turning the stigmas of the people into virtues. 
Juan and Eva Perón transformed the shirtless masses despised by the elites into the 
embodiment of the Argentinean nation.
27
 The feared rabble became the “beloved 
rabble” of Colombian populist Jorge Eliecer Gaitán.28 When his followers were depicted 
as a bunch of “whores and criminals”, Ecuadorian populist Abdalá Bucaram responded: 
“the marihuana user, criminal, and whore is the Ecuadorian oligarchy”29. 
The people is embodied in a leader. In a message to the National Assembly in 
2003, the late Hugo Chávez said: “I am not myself, I am the people”. In another 
occasion he asserted: “this is not about Hugo Chávez this is about a people”30. Under 
the populist imaginary the people does not face political adversaries but sinful enemies. 
Hugo Chávez, for example, “constantly separates the ‘people,’ the ‘true’ patriots, from 
the ‘oligarchy’, those self-serving elites who work against the homeland. During the 
general strike called by the opposition [in 2001], Chavez declared, ‘this is not about the 
pro-Chavez against the anti-Chavez […] but […] the patriots against the enemies of the 
homeland’”31. Enemies are constructed with a moralistic logic as not “sharing a 
common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place”32. Differently from 
adversaries who fight according to a shared set of rules, and whose positions could be 
accepted, enemies represent an evil threat that must be eradicated. 
Populist rhetoric assembles all social, economic, cultural, and ethnic 
differentiations and oppressions into two irreconcilable poles: the pure people versus 
evil and rotten elites. The notion of “the people” incorporates the idea of antagonistic 
                                               
24. Ibid., p. 253. 
25. Francisco PANIZZA, “What Do We Mean When We Talk About Populism?”, in Carlos DE LA TORRE 
and Cynthia ARNSON (eds.), Latin American Populism in the Twenty First Century, Baltimore and 
Washington, The Johns Hopkins University and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2013. 
26. RANCIÈRE, Dissensus, p. 38. 
27. Daniel JAMES, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-1976, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
28 .Herbert BRAUN, The Assassination of Gaitán: Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia, Chicago : 
University of Chicago Press, 1985. 
29. DE LA TORRE, Populist Seduction in Latin America, pp. 80-118. 
30. José Pedro ZÚQUETE, “The Missionary Politics of Hugo Chavez," Latin American Politics and 
Society, 50/ 1 (2008), p. 100-104. 
31. Ibid., p. 105. 
32. Chantal MOUFFE, On the Political, London, Routledge, 2005, p. 20. 
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conflict between two groups, with the romantic view of the purity of the people. As a 
result, “the people” of populism has been imagined as an undifferentiated, unified, 
fixed, and homogenous entity
33
. The populist image of the people is fixed in time, the 
will of the people is conceived as transparent, so to speak, especially when they resist 
and challenge the symbolic, economic, and political domination of the oligarchy. But as 
Paulina Ochoa argues the people is a process, it is an unfolding series of events. “The 
people is always under construction and for this reason its will is also incomplete”34. 
Liberals construct “the people”, Ochoa argues with criteria of self-limitation. 
They view the people as indeterminate, accept the view that the will of the people can 
and probably will change, and for this reason “their appeal to the people’s will is 
fallible, temporary, and incomplete.” The people of populism is conceived as inherently 
right, the voice of the people is always indefeasible, and populists do not accept 
limitations on their claims to be the authentic and truthful voice of the people.  
Rafael Correa who holds a US Ph.D. in economics combines technocratic with 
populist discourses. Different from liberal views of self-limitation Correa sees himself 
as having a mission: to lead a “citizen’s revolution” to achieve the second and definitive 
liberation of his motherland. He claims that like the founding fathers, “We are ready to 
risk our lives to bring change”35. The second liberation that Correa is leading is part of a 
continental wide movement. He ends his speeches quoting Che Guevara’s famous 
words “till victory forever!” In front of an audience of policemen he said: “Nobody 
takes a step backwards. This revolution will not be sold nor will surrender”36. He 
legitimizes his government with understandings of revolution “as a radical, profound 
and rapid transformation of political, social and economic structures”37. Politics for 
Correa is not based on consensus. Rather it is viewed as a struggle to reach the 
liberation of the motherland. He claimed that his revolution “is irreversible, and nobody 
would stop it”38. 
Correa sees himself as the only voice that can speak on behalf of “the people.” 
Dissent, even from the left, is portrayed as treason. He is not just the voice of “people,” 
he also acts as if he embodies their unitary will and interests. The people’s trust in his 
leadership is reiterated in all the elections he has won. Electoral triumphs and carrying 
social policies on behalf of the poor transformed him into the new liberator. Social 
movement organizations that are critical to his policies are portrayed as representing the 
interests of the oligarchy and of the old regime controlled by corrupt political parties, 
and corporatist interest groups. He called environmentalists who challenged his 
extractivist policies aniñaditos (well-to-do, infantile and pampered children lacking 
                                               
33. Leonardo AVRITZER, Democracy and the Public Sphere in Latin America, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2002, p. 72. 
34. See also: Paulina OCHOA, The Time of Popular Sovereignty. Process and the Democratic State, 
University Park Pennsylvania, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011. 
35. Rafael CORREA “Discurso de Posesión del Presidente de la República, Economista Rafael Correa”, 
Quito,10 de agosto 2009. 
36. Rafael CORREA, “Intervención Presidencial en el Acto de Entrega de Armas en el Comando 
Provincial de Manabí”, Portoviejo, 12 de marzo 2009. 
37. Rafael CORREA “Experiencia de un Cristiano de Izquierda en un Mundo secular” Oxford Union 
Society, 26 de octubre 2009. 
38. Rafael CORREA “Discurso de Posesión del Presidente de la República, Economista, Rafael Correa”, 
Quito, 10 de agosto 2009. 
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proper masculinity) “with full belies who oppose everything all the time”. He contended 
that “infantile radical” ecologists are “the main danger to our project”. A few months 
later he corroborated: “We always said that the main danger to our political project, 
after defeating the right in elections, are the infantile left, environmentalists, and 
indigenists”.39 In October 2009, in the midst of a conflict over water usage, he called the 
leadership of the indigenous organization Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of 
Ecuador (CONAIE), “golden ponchos” and “Indian Whigs” out of touch with their 
social base. 
Religious images are often used to represent essentialist narratives of the people. 
The Christian story of paradise lost-sin-redemption epitomizes the saga of the people, 
the proletariat, the indigenous, or the nation. An idyllic and free of domination past was 
lost due to the imposition of alien cultural and economic systems. The role of the 
liberator is to free the people from suffering in order to let their true and uncorrupted 
essence to flourish again. The advent of the left wing leader of the coca growers union 
Evo Morales to the presidency of Bolivia in 2006 was linked to the Pachakuti, “the 
founding event or break in historical time in which an unjust world is destroyed and a 
new one is born, renovated, and redeemed”40. The new Bolivian Constitution aimed to 
refound the nation, decolonize Bolivian society, and to establish indigenous 
communitarian democracy. Some members of Morales government conceived of his 
regime as the beginning of the end of colonialism, capitalism, and bourgeois 
representative democracy. Bolivia’s Minister of Foreign Relations David Choquehuanca 
argued that Bolivia that was living under the “age of darkness” is moving towards 
communitarianism understood as the end of hatred and capitalism, and the beginning of 
love
41
. 
The mythical and essentialist constructions of the people, that are a response to 
the stigmas ascribed to them by elites, might restore the dignity of those constructed as 
having no voice. Yet these mythical interpretations, even in cases where the people refer 
to the excluded, could have authoritarian undertones, as illustrated by how Correa labels 
his leftist opponents as the main danger to the revolution. The image of the indigenous 
people under Evo Morales government while inclusionary also excludes indigenous 
people who oppose policies of his administration such as the construction of roads in 
indigenous territories.  
In their effort to give a voice to those who do not have a voice, populists might 
open the door for authoritarian fantasies. If the people is assumed to be homogeneous, if 
images of the people do not acknowledge the internal divisions of the people and 
society, the danger is the creation of an image of the People as One
42
.  
                                               
39. Rafael CORREA “Informe a la Nación en el Inicio del Tercer Año de Revolución Ciudadana”. Quito, 
19 de enero 2009. 
40. Charles LINDHOLM and Pedro José ZÚQUETE, The Struggle for the World. Liberation Movements for 
the 21st Century, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010, p. 40. 
41. Mabel AZCUI, “Bolivia anuncia una nueva era sin capitalismo ni Coca Cola”, El País, 1 de agosto de 
2012, <http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2012/08/01/actualidad/1343840750_594247.html> 
(consulted -3-24-2013). 
42. Claude LEFORT, The Political Forms of Modern Society. Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, 
edited and introduced by John B. Thompson, Cambridge, The MIT Press, 1986. 
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The Bodies of the People 
Inspired by Kantarowicz’s seminal book, The King’s Two Bodies, scholars write 
about the people’s two bodies43. “The people” is individual and collective, active and 
passive, whole and part, the despised mob and the redeeming People that on occasions 
rise up in unison against injustices. According to Kantarowicz, the King like God was 
“omnipresent, for in himself he constituted the ‘body politic’ over which he ruled. But 
like his son whom God send to redeem mankind, he was man as well as God; he had a 
‘body natural’ as well as his body politic, and the two were inseparable like the persons 
of the Trinity”44. Edmund Morgan writes that the fiction of the divine rights of kings, 
however dubious his divinity might seem, did not have to be imagined. “He was a 
visible presence, wearing his crown and carrying his specter”45. The king’s body was 
mortal and time bound, as well as immortal and eternal. It was imagined as individual as 
well as collective.  
Different from the king, who had a corporeal body, “the very existence of such a 
thing as the people, capable of acting to empower, define, and limit a previously 
nonexistent government required a suspension of disbelief”46. 
The people are never visible at such. Before we ascribe sovereignty to the people we 
have to imagine that there is such a thing, something we personify as though it were a 
single body, capable of thinking, of acting, of making decisions and carrying them out, 
something quite apart from government, superior to government, and able to alter or 
remove a government at will, a collective entity more powerful and less fallible than a 
king or that an individual within it or any group of individual it singles out to govern47. 
Once the immortal body of the king and the body of the politic was decapitated 
during the revolutions of the 18
th
 century, the space occupied by the religious political 
body of the king was opened. Claude Lefort wrote that power was no longer linked to a 
body: “Power appears as an empty place and those who exercise it as merely mortals 
who occupy it only temporarily or who could install themselves in it only by force or 
cunning”48. Under democracy, the people of today are not necessarily the people of 
tomorrow, as the power of today is not the power of tomorrow
49
. Under democracy the 
image of the people “remains indeterminate”.  
The uncertainty of democracy where power belongs to the people in abstract, but 
not to a concrete individual who at the most could occupy it temporarily, could lead to 
the destruction of democracy. According to Claude Lefort, the revolutions of the 18
th
 
century also generated “from the outset the principle that would threaten the emptiness 
of that space: popular sovereignty in the sense of a subject incarnated in a group, 
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however extensive, a stratum however poor, and institution or a person, however 
popular”50. Totalitarianism thus “appears as a forced attempt, a crazed attempt to fill up, 
even to saturate the empty place”51. Symbolically this is done by abandoning the 
democratic imagination of the people as “heterogeneous, multiple, and in conflict” and 
where power does not belong to no one with the image of the People-as-One that denies 
that division is constitutive of society
52
. Under totalitarianism there are no internal 
divisions of the people. The divide is between the people, imagined as having one 
identity and one will, with its external enemies that need to be eliminated in order to 
maintain the healthy body of the people.  
Lefort conceives that democracy and totalitarianism are opposites. He does not 
analyze the gradations between the extremes of total emptiness and embodiment
53
. Nor 
does he differentiate between totalitarian projects and regimes
54
. Totalitarian projects 
might be resisted by civil society and might not end up in totalitarian regimes. Populism 
lay between democracy and totalitarianism. Differently from totalitarianism, under 
populism power is not embodied permanently in the proletariat, the nation, the party, or 
the Egocrat. Political theorist Isidoro Cheresky argues that power under populism is 
semi-embodied (semi-encarnado) because populists claim legitimacy in wining open 
and free elections that they could conceivably loose, and they might be bound by 
electoral results
55
. Yet, because populists simultaneously assume that they embody the 
will of the people, that the will of the people is always right, and that they are fighting 
against hideous elites, they might have a hard time accepting that they could lose 
popular elections. Paulina Ochoa writes that, for López Obrador, “the people is always 
right, and thus it can have only one unified voice and will. This means that, in his view, 
it was ‘morally impossible’ that the opposition could win”.  
Similarly, Chávez, Correa, and Morales view elections as the ultimate 
expression of the people’s will. Their democratic credentials are grounded in wining 
open and clean elections, that in theory they could lose. Participating in elections opens 
the possibility of their defeat, and hence these leaders skewed the electoral playing field. 
Incumbents are given extraordinary advantages such as using the media, selectively 
silencing the privately owned media, selectively harassing the opposition, controlling 
electoral tribunal boards and all instances of appeal, and using massive public 
investment before the election. When Chávez, Morales, and Correa won elections the 
process of voting was clean, but the electoral process blatantly favored incumbents. For 
instance, before the elections of October 2012, Chávez massively increased social 
spending, launched new missions that focused on housing, social security benefits for 
those who were not part of the system, and cash transfers for the children of adolescent 
parents.
56
 Differently from Correa who has been campaigning since he became 
                                               
50. Andrew ARATO, “Lefort, the Philosopher of 1989”, Constellations, 19/1 (2012), p. 23. 
51. ROSANVALLON, “The Test of the Political: A Conversation with Claude Lefort”, p. 11. 
52. LEFORT, The Political Forms of Modern Society., p. 297. 
53. LACLAU, On Populist Reason, p. 166. 
54. ARATO, “Lefort, the Philosopher of 1989”, p. 28. 
55. Isidoro CHERESKY, “Mutación democrática, otra ciudadanía, otras representaciones”, in Isidoro 
CHERESKY (ed.), ¿Qué Democracia en América Latina?, Buenos Aires, CLACSO Prometeo, 2012, p. 33. 
56. Margarita LÓPEZ MAYA and Luis LANDER, ‘las elecciones de octubre del 2012 en Venezuela y el 
Debate de la democracia en América Latina’ unpublished document, 2012. 
  
DOSSIER The people from contemporary Latin American lefts 
Rubrica Contemporanea, Vol. 2, N. 3, 2013 
ISSN. 2014-5748 
15 
 
president in 2007, the opposition only had 42 days to campaign during the February 
2013 elections. Correa used televised broadcasts, that all stations are force to transmit, 
for instance to challenge media reports that his running mate Jorge Glass plagiarized his 
college thesis from the internet. The government used state media outlets to broadcast 
live from Correa’s campaign trail. According to Participación Ciudadana, a NGO that 
monitored the election, Correa’s exposure on television was more than the double of his 
rivals. In order to assure a majority in the new Assembly, additional electoral districts 
were designed in Quito and Guayaquil, two strongholds of Correa. The National 
Electoral Council refrained stopping the incumbent of using state resources as when 
Correa made use of army helicopters in his campaign. The Electoral Council did not 
control how pro-Correa propaganda was broadcasted in the state run media, and forced 
the leftwing ticket to withdraw a televised add entitled “the little king and his court” 
alleging that it was offensive to President Correa. The government regulated how the 
privately owned media reported the campaign, prohibiting it to endorse candidates. As a 
result, most newspapers refrained from publishing photographs and stories about the 
closing campaigns acts.
57
 The use of public resources, the abuses of their time in the 
media, and the lack of mechanism of control led some scholars to use the concept of 
“competitive authoritarianism” to characterize these left wing populist regimes58. 
 
“The People”: Between Everyday Politics and Eschatological Salvation  
The people could be conceived as a collection of individuals that participate in 
political institutions, and simultaneously as a collective body “that establishes these 
institutions and has a final say on their legitimacy”59. These two views of the people –as 
individual actors of everyday politics, and as the foundation of democratic legitimacy– 
gave form to what Margaret Canovan analyzes as the “two phases of democracy”. 
Democracy according to Canovan has a pragmatic and a redemptive phase that often are 
in tension. From a pragmatic point of view it is a form of government that allows 
society to cope peacefully with conflicts. It is made of institutions that limit the power 
of the few who govern, as well as of those who are governed. Yet democracy also has a 
redemptive phase. “The content of democracy's redemptive promise is power to the 
people; we, the people, are to take charge of our lives and to decide our own future”60. 
Margaret Canovan uses the example of Solidarity in Poland to illustrate how the 
people –conceived simultaneously as the source of sovereign legitimacy, the underdog, 
and the nation– acted as a mythical collectivity against a regime that grounded its 
legitimacy as a people’s democracy61. Yet this was perhaps one exceptional case. Most 
often actors stage rebellions claiming to speak for the people as a whole, while in fact 
excluding many from their mythical conceptions. For instance, Ecuador and Bolivia 
lived through episodes of collective action that redefined the meanings of the terms “the 
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people”, and “democracy”. Between 1997 and 2005 three elected presidents of Ecuador 
were deposed by what many interpreted as the sovereign people rebelling against 
illegitimate governments. From 2000 to 2005, Bolivia went through a cycle of 
insurrections against neoliberalism and corrupt politicians that led scholars to debate 
whether that nation underwent a revolutionary moment. These rebellions in Bolivia and 
Ecuador were lived as populist resurrections. “The people” without intermediaries took 
their political destinies into their own hands. Democratic legitimacy was understood to 
lie in crowd action where the people directly and without intermediaries expressed its 
sovereign will. Yet, during these insurrections entire geographical regions such as 
Bolivia’s lowlands or the Ecuadorian coast, where the large cities of Santa Cruz and 
Guayaquil are located, did not join in. Large segments of the population did not have 
any voice in how these governments were toppled. Therefore, what for some were 
populist inherently democratizing insurrections, for others were examples of coup 
d'état.
 62
  
Margaret Canovan is well aware of the possible threat of mythical conceptions 
of the people to democracy. There is a danger that the empty space becomes 
permanently occupied, and that democracy could be used to justify authoritarian 
regimes. Ernesto Laclau’s influential theory of populism, due to its Schmittian view of 
the political as the struggle between friend and enemy, as Andrew Arato argues could 
be used to justified authoritarian regimes.
63
 Laclau, in his book On Populist Reason, 
argues that populism is synonymous with the political. He contrasts the logics of 
difference and the logics of equivalence. The first presupposes that “any legitimate 
demand can be satisfied in a non-antagonistic, administrative way”64. Unlike differences 
that could be resolved with an administrative logic in an individual basis, there are 
demands that could not be resolved individually and aggregate themselves forming an 
equivalence chain. Under the logic of equivalence “all the demands in spite of their 
differential character, tend to aggregate themselves” becoming “fighting demands” that 
cannot be resolve by the institutional system
65
. The social space splits into two camps: 
Power and the underdog
66
. The logic of populist articulation is anti-institutional; it is 
based in the construction of an enemy; and in an equivalential logic that leads to the 
rupture of the system because individual demands cannot be processed. Under 
populism, the name of the leader becomes an empty signifier “to which a multiplicity of 
meanings could be attributed”67. 
As the pair of terms used by Laclau illustrate, everyday mundane and 
administrative politics are contrasted to those exceptional moments of populist rupture. 
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He argues that the division of society into two antagonistic camps is required in order to 
put an end to exclusionary institutional systems and to forge an alternative order
68
. By 
giving normative priority to populist rupture, Laclau embraces myths of the revolution 
as the overhaul of all existing institutions. Reformist institutional improvements are 
ruled out by normative eschatological constructions of revolutionary politics.  
Furet wrote that the French Revolution inaugurated the belief that man was 
“conscious of the history he was making, but he also knew that he was saved or 
condemned in and by that history”69. Laclau, true to this view, sees himself as the 
“Prince Counselor”70. He has become a public intellectual who not only advocates the 
need for populist ruptures, but who advises Argentinean presidents Ernesto and Cristina 
Kirchner on how to constitute such a popular subject. He decries that Argentinean 
relatively strong institutions and complex civil society are impediments to a populist 
rupture
71
. Because populist rupture entails the destruction of old institutions and the 
creation of a new institutional order, populist leaders and/or their coalitions might be 
required to stay in power until their job is done. Laclau’s theory of populism might 
therefore open the door for authoritarian fantasies of power as a possession. Because the 
political, as for Carl Schmitt, is a struggle between friend and enemy, it is difficult to 
imagine adversaries who have legitimate institutional spaces. Differently from Chantal 
Mouffe’s adversarial model of the political, where adversaries have legitimate spaces, 
enemies as in Schmitt’s view might need to be manufactured and destroyed.  
Chávez, and the opposition, polarized politics as a Manichean struggle between 
friends and enemies
72
. The logic of equivalency transformed all forms of dissensus into 
full-blown confrontations between antagonistic camps. Polarization was illustrated 
during Chávez’s illness when half of the population prayed for his death and half for his 
recovery from cancer. After his death, the government of Maduro continues to stage all 
political conflicts as Manichean struggles between the patriotic camp embodied in 
Chávez nowadays deified as a Saint, and the enemies of the nation, the people, and the 
“process”.  
 
Who Speaks for the People? 
When “the people” is invoked, we need to explain who is claiming to speak on 
its behalf. Politics is a matter of establishing who speaks for the people
73
. The people 
can speak through insurrections, voting to delegate power to representatives, or by 
identification between a leader and the led. Rebellions and revolutions give the 
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impression that “the people comes into existence through collective action, somehow 
emerging as both the director and actor of its own destiny”74. During extraordinary 
events the people acquire a face and a voice, and are given an imaginary social 
cohesion. Doubts about how a group of individuals could become a unitary actor with a 
single voice are suspended. It is imagined that the people speak by directly taking over 
the symbols of state power that excluded them, while simultaneously creating new 
symbols and institutions. 
Even if we accept that the people during extraordinary events can temporarily 
speak in unison to say “enough”, their collective action does not solve the problem of 
what happens after the event. “How can (the people) retain a recognizable form, and 
how to hear its disappeared voice once the event is over and done?”75. Liberal and 
populist give alternative answers to the question of how does the people speak when it 
is not insurrecting. Representation is based on a constitutive gap between “the people as 
the legitimate sovereign, in its unity in principle, and the people as an existing society, 
in its actual complexity”76. How to preserve the complexity of society while appealing 
to the unity of the sovereign people? Mediated forms of representation accept the 
complexity and diversity of the people in an existing society, whereas populist 
representation seeks its unity in the embodiment of the people in the figure or in the 
name of a leader.  
Mediated forms of representation are based on the principle of non-identity 
between representatives and their constituency. A collectivity “authorizes some 
individuals to speak for it, and eventually to commit the collectivity to what the 
representative decides”77. Representatives, for their part, are accountable for their 
actions. Liberal representation is based on as series of mediations such as constitutional 
restrains, divisions of powers, and check and balances.  
Populism is a response to the crises of mediated representation. Populists 
discourse portraits mediations and restrains as impediments that the elite uses to exclude 
the people. Populists view elections as the “decisive moment of the representative 
contract”78. Elections are understood as processes of popular authorization that exclude 
any element of accountability. For example, after winning the election of 1949, General 
Juan Perón said, “we have given the people the opportunity to choose, in the cleanest 
elections in the history of Argentina, between us and our opponents. The people have 
elected us, so the problem is resolved. What we want is now done in the republic of 
Argentina”79.  
Populist representation is based on the “merging and full identity between a 
representative and those who seek representation”80. Because the leader claims to be 
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like the people he knows their interest and can incarnate their will. Under populist 
discourse the people share an identity, interests, and form a collective body “which is 
able to express this will and take decisions”81. The leader perceives himself not as an 
ordinary politicians elected in a succession of temporarily elected officials. He rather 
sees himself as the incarnation of the people
82
. After winning the 2009 presidential 
elections, Rafael Correa asserted: “Ecuador voted for itself”. This way, he claims to 
embody the will of all Ecuadorians. In several speeches he reiterated to be leading 
Ecuador’s second independence. Because of the immensity of his mission, he has faced 
the opposition of traditional parties, bankers, the privately owned media, and what he 
describes as the leadership of corporatist social movements such as teachers, students, 
and indigenous organizations. He has labelled ecologists and the indigenous movements 
as the infantile leftwing that serves the interests of the right. His administration has 
charged over 200 peasant and indigenous activists as terrorists. 
As Benjamín Arditi writes, the fantasy of the unity of the people and of their 
merging with the leader “opens the door for a perception of the exercise of political 
power as a possession rather than as occupancy, which, in turn, is conducive to a 
patrimonial use of state resources”83. Citizens are transformed into grateful masses that 
accept resources distributed from the top down
84
. Ethnographic studies show that 
programs of social distribution in Ecuador, for example, are used to build beneficiaries 
who feel personally obliged to president Correa. Anthropologist Luis Tuazo shows that 
the recipients of the bonus for human development that allocates 35 dollars to single 
mothers, the elderly, the disabled, and the poorest feel that they need to reciprocate the 
government. An indigenous woman from Tixan, in the Province of Chimborazo, 
reported: “Today I am grateful to God and to President Correa. I have the cash transfer 
to buy food, pay for electricity, and can buy a little something for my kids”. Another 
woman corroborated: “Thanks to the President I get 35 dollars”. As one respondent 
summarized the feelings of reciprocity, “the government takes care of us, we have to be 
grateful”85. 
Politicians are not the only actors who claim to be the voice or the spokesmen of 
the people. Social movement activists also claim to speak for them, and to be their 
representatives, and even their embodiment. In Bolivia for example, strong social 
movements curtail Morales’ attempts to be the voice of the unitary people, forcing him 
to negotiate and even to reverse policies. Participation is mostly bottom up, and the 
government relies on the mobilization of social movements in conflicts with the 
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opposition
86
. Evo Morales came to power at the peak of indigenous led popular protest 
against neoliberalism and pacted democracy. His party is the political instrument of 
strong social movements. Participation in Bolivia is grounded in communitarian 
traditions where all participate and deliberate until a decision is made. Leaders at all 
levels are accountable to their social base. Hence, participation under Morales is more 
bottom-up than in Venezuela or Ecuador. Organizations of the subaltern have forced the 
government to reverse policies such as the increase of gasoline prices and wage 
restraints in 2011. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper showed the ambiguities of the highly emotional terms of the people 
and populism. These concepts, as shown in this article, oscillate between poles: threat 
and promise, danger and redemption. The article illustrated how constructions of the 
people continue to appeal to notions of the dangerous mobs. It illustrates how elites 
appropriate the voice of the people to legitimate their rule as the rightful interpreters.  
Activists, and dissenters, including populist politicians challenge the rule of 
elites, claim to speak for the people. Their interventions aim to disrupt the normalcy of 
things, and of the status quo. Workers, for instance, “spoke in order to say that they 
were not those Others, those ‘barbarians’ that bourgeois discourse denounced”87. 
Dissenters destabilize the common sense that gives authority to the voices of some 
people of the community, and that recognizes some issues as valid and important. A 
dissensus is “a dispute over what is given and about the frame within which we see 
something as given”88. It is “a practice of disidentification whereby the people refuse to 
accept the place –often of the excluded underdog—assigned to them”89.  
Challenges to the exclusion of those considered having no voice, and to those 
whose issues are interpreted as irrelevant or particularistic are of course potentially 
democratizing. This type of interventions is what gives democratic credentials to 
populist and social movement activists. The question is how these demands will be 
processed. Will they entail a deepening of democracy maintaining its representative 
fabric, mediations, checks and balances, which allow for pluralism and contestation? Or 
would they lead to Jacobin symbolic appropriations of the people’s will90, and to 
attempts to occupy the open space of democracy?  
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